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COMPLEMENTARY CONSTRAINTS:  
SEPARATION OF POWERS, RATIONAL VOTING,  
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Jide O. Nzelibe
∗ and Matthew C. Stephenson
∗∗ 
This Article explores how the separation of powers affects voters’ electoral strategies, and 
how this interaction influences the performance of different institutional arrangements.  
We show that when one political agent, such as the President, acts unilaterally, voters 
are likely to respond asymmetrically to policy successes and failures in order to offset the 
risk that the President may be biased or “captured” by special interest groups.  When 
political agents act in concert — such as when the President seeks congressional 
authorization for a policy initiative — voters prefer a more refined strategy, with less 
acute asymmetries between political rewards and punishments.  Our analysis has 
positive and normative implications.  First, it suggests that presidents do not always 
prefer to operate with as little congressional interference as possible.  Second, it provides 
a rationalist account for “responsibility shifting” by elected officials — behavior that is 
usually thought to derive from voter confusion or irrationality.  Third, it suggests that 
separation of powers does not necessarily induce “gridlock” or otherwise reduce the 
likelihood of policy change.  Fourth, it suggests that although separation of powers 
enhances the efficacy of the electoral constraint on politicians, voter welfare is higher 
when separation of powers is “optional” rather than mandatory, as when the President 
may seek congressional authorization for policy initiatives but is not required to do so. 
he voter, the political theorist V.O. Key once observed, is the “ra-
tional god of vengeance and of reward.”1  The extent to which 
voters can influence policy choices by rewarding or punishing politi-
cians has long been a central concern for both political science and le-
gal scholarship.  Few political systems, however, rely solely on voter 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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    We are grateful to David Austen-Smith, Kenneth Ayotte, David Baron, David Barron, Jack 
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John Coates, Einer Elhauge, Dick Fallon, Jake Gersen, Jim Greiner, Louis Kaplow, Daryl Levin-
son, Katerina Linos, Dan Meltzer, Gerry Neuman, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Nathaniel Persily, 
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workshops at Harvard, Michigan, Columbia, USC, and Georgetown Law Schools, as well as par-
ticipants at the Harvard Conference on Political Economy and Public Law, for helpful comments 
on earlier drafts. 
  1  V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 568 (5th ed. 1964).  Ironically, 
Key’s specific usage of this famous and oft-misquoted phrase was skeptical: “The Founding Fa-
thers, by the provision for midterm elections, built into the constitutional system a procedure 
whose strange consequences lack explanation in any theory that personifies the electorate as a 
rational god of vengeance and of reward.”  Id.  Nonetheless, as Professor Larry Bartels has ob-
served, this phrase has become commonly associated with V.O. Key’s more optimistic account of 
the rational retrospective voter spelled out in The Responsible Electorate in 1966.  See LARRY M. 
BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 126 n.29 (2008). 
T   
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discipline to constrain elected policymakers.  Instead, most advanced 
democracies rely on a combination of both electoral discipline and 
some form of internal separation of powers to reduce political “agency 
slack” (the deviation between the behavior of political agents and what 
the voter-principals would prefer).  Electoral accountability ameli-
orates agency slack by punishing poorly performing incumbents and 
rewarding successful ones.2  Separation of powers ameliorates agency 
slack by reducing the possibility that a biased or parochial interest 
group will be able to use the power of the state for its own ends.3   
While the academic literature contains numerous sophisticated 
treatments of both elections and separation of powers, the literature 
has paid surprisingly little attention to how these different forms of in-
stitutional control interact.4  The possibility of such interaction raises a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  2  See generally, e.g., TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? (2006); MORRIS P. FIORI-
NA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); G. BINGHAM 
POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY (2000); David Austen-Smith & 
Jeffrey Banks, Electoral Accountability and Incumbency, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE 
IN POLITICS 121 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989); George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Conflict, 
Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,  38 A M.  J. 
POL. SCI. 362 (1994); James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: 
Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILI-
TY, AND REPRESENTATION 55 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999); John Ferejohn, Incumbent 
Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE 5 (1986); G. Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. 
Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context, 
37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 391 (1993). 
  3  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 289–90 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) 
(“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
ment consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”); see also, e.g., AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 63–64 (2005) (arguing that separation of powers not only 
prevents tyranny, but also facilitates a division of labor that promotes government efficiency); 
LOUIS  FISHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONFLICTS  BETWEEN  CONGRESS  AND  THE  PRESI-
DENT 10 (4th ed., rev. 1997) (“Without the power to resist encroachments by another branch, a 
department might find its powers drained to the point of extinction.”); Martin H. Redish & Eliza-
beth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of 
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 487–506 (1991) (advocating the enforcement of separation of 
powers to prevent tyranny and bolster democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43 (1985) (“[T]he separation of powers scheme was designed 
with the recognition that even national representatives may be prone to the influence of ‘interests’ 
that are inconsistent with the public welfare.”); cf. Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional Environ-
ment for Economic Growth, 12 ECON. & POL. 1 (2000); George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Po-
litical Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipar-
tyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995). 
  4  There are some notable exceptions to this general statement.  See Christopher R. Berry & 
Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008); Jacob E. Gersen, 
Unbundled Powers, 96 V A. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2010); Tim Groseclose & Nolan McCarty, 
The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 100 (2001); Timothy 
Hellwig & David Samuels, Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes, 38 
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 65 (2008); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000); Torsten Persson et al., Separation of Powers and Political Ac-
countability, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1163 (1997); David J. Samuels & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presiden-
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number of important questions.  To what extent does the separation of 
powers influence how voters wield their electoral power to reward or 
punish incumbent politicians?  Is the separation of powers principally 
a substitute for electoral discipline, restraining biased government ac-
tors when voters are not able to do so effectively?  Or might certain 
separation of powers regimes complement electoral accountability, 
making electoral discipline more effective than it would be otherwise?  
The answers to these questions bear on a more significant question: 
What institutional configuration best serves voter welfare?  Are voters 
better off when one institution has exclusive control over a policy deci-
sion?  Are they better off when two or more institutions must act to-
gether, as when the President must get congressional authorization or 
Congress must secure presidential approval?  Or would rational voters 
prefer a system in which the different branches of government have 
the option of acting jointly or unilaterally? 
While this Article does not aspire to provide comprehensive an-
swers to these questions, it contributes to our understanding of these 
issues by analyzing how separation of powers and electoral accounta-
bility interact in a particular political environment.  We consider a set-
ting in which rational retrospective voters can observe both ex post 
policy outcomes and the decisionmaking process — including which 
institutions participated and the positions that they took — but voters 
can observe neither politicians’ true preferences nor whether the deci-
sion taken was the correct one from an ex ante perspective.  Moreover, 
we assume that while voters cannot observe whether a politician is bi-
ased, voters can infer (from the politician’s party affiliation or other 
information) the likely direction of any such bias.5  In this environ-
ment, we show that rational voters will adjust their punishment and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tialism, Elections and Representation, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 33 (2003); Justin Fox & Richard 
Van Weelden, Partisanship and the Effectiveness of Oversight (May 20, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1325580; Razvan Vlaicu, 
Executive Performance Under Direct and Hierarchical Accountability Structures: Theory and 
Evidence (Dec. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1051661; Razvan Vlaicu, Legislative Spending Bias, Fragmentation of Fiscal 
Power and Electoral Accountability (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079882.  For our own prior contributions to the 
study of the interaction between separation of powers and electoral behavior, see Jide Nzelibe, Are 
Congressionally Authorized Wars Perverse?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2007); Matthew C. Stephen-
son,  Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence,  20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 379 (2004); Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008); and Matthew C. Stephenson & Jide O. Nzelibe, Political Accounta-
bility Under Alternative Institutional Regimes, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. (forthcoming 2010). 
  5  For clarification, we use the term bias to capture any difference between the President’s 
preferences and those of the median voter.  Thus, in our stylized illustrations in Part II, the source 
of the President’s bias is due to the capture of the President by an interest group; otherwise, the 
President and the median voter would have the same preferences and the President would be con-
sidered unbiased.    
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reward strategies to compensate for the expected bias of the political 
decisionmakers but will do so in markedly different ways under differ-
ent separation of powers regimes.  This interaction between the insti-
tutional regime and rational voters’ electoral strategies has positive 
implications for political behavior as well as normative implications 
for optimal institutional design. 
A sketch of our argument is as follows.  Consider as a baseline case 
a situation in which all authority over some policy decision is concen-
trated in a single elected official, such as the President.  The President 
may be biased, but the voters are not sure whether he is.  The voters 
are also unsure about which policy would best serve their interests.  In 
this case, a rational voter would prefer an asymmetric reward and pu-
nishment strategy: When the President takes an action that is consis-
tent with his possible biases, voters will reward him less generously if 
the policy succeeds and punish him more harshly if it fails.  (For ex-
ample, voters who suspect that the President might be excessively en-
thusiastic about military interventions abroad might punish the Presi-
dent more harshly if an intervention fails and reward the President less 
generously if it succeeds.)  In contrast, if the President’s action goes 
against his likely biases, voters will reward success more generously 
and punish failure less harshly.  In this way, voters offset (imperfectly) 
the biases to which the President may fall prey.   
This asymmetric strategy, however, has significant costs.  These 
costs are due to the voters’ uncertainty about both the correct policy 
choice and the true magnitude of the President’s bias.  If the incum-
bent President is more biased in favor of a particular policy than the 
voters expected, the voters’ electoral strategy will not adequately deter 
unwarranted action (resulting in “false positives”).  On the other hand, 
if the President turns out to be less biased than expected, the voters’ 
electoral strategy will deter action even in some cases where that ac-
tion would have been in the voters’ interest (“false negatives”). 
An institutional separation of powers allows for a more refined 
strategy, reducing the probability of false positives and false negatives.  
The reason is that when voters can use electoral rewards and punish-
ments to manipulate the incentives of two actors rather than one, they 
do not need to impose such large asymmetries in the rewards for suc-
cess and the punishments for failure.  So, for example, when indepen-
dent branches make policy jointly — as when the President seeks and 
receives congressional authorization for a military intervention abroad 
— rational retrospective voters can employ a more nuanced strategy, 
with less of an asymmetry in the magnitude of political credit and 
blame, because Congress will screen out some of the President’s unde-
sirable policies.  This dynamic, upon which we elaborate in Part II, 
has a number of implications for both positive and normative constitu-
tional theory.  Four in particular stand out:    
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First, our analysis casts doubt on the oft-repeated claim that presi-
dents will usually oppose sharing power with Congress.  On the con-
trary, presidents will often forego the opportunity to act unilaterally 
because doing so reduces their political risk. 
Second, our analysis provides a rationalist account for forms of po-
litical behavior that are sometimes thought to derive from voter confu-
sion or irrationality, such as the apparent ability of politicians to “shift 
responsibility” for unpopular or risky actions by involving other politi-
cal actors in the decision.  Whereas the more conventional responsibili-
ty-shifting explanations imply that the separation of powers tends to 
undermine electoral accountability, our alternative hypothesis suggests 
that behavioral patterns that superficially resemble responsibility shift-
ing may actually indicate that the separation of powers is facilitating 
effective electoral control. 
Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that separation 
of powers does not necessarily increase “gridlock” or “status quo bias” 
— or at least that claims to this effect may be exaggerated.  In a sys-
tem in which one actor (say, the President) has authority to act unilate-
rally, the President has great formal flexibility to choose whatever poli-
cy he wants, but rational voters will punish the President’s policy 
failures quite harshly in order to offset the President’s possible bias.  
Adding another veto player — for example, by requiring congressional 
approval of presidential initiatives — has two effects.  The first-order 
effect is to reduce the President’s freedom of action because there are 
some policies an unconstrained President would prefer to enact that 
Congress would oppose.  The second-order effect derives from rational 
voters’ awareness of the first-order effect: because voters know that 
Congress will block some fraction of undesirable presidential initia-
tives, voters do not need to punish the President for policy failure as 
harshly in order to compensate for his possible bias.  This second effect 
— the relaxation of the electoral deterrent to action — tends to in-
crease the President’s propensity to initiate policy change.  While there 
is no guarantee that this second-order effect will fully offset the first-
order effect of adding a veto player, such a result is possible.  Thus, 
claims that the separation of powers necessarily reduces the quantity 
or frequency of policy change may need to be reconsidered. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, our analysis suggests that 
voters may be better off under a system of separated powers in which 
the agenda-setting political actor (for example, the President) has the 
option to seek the approval of another branch (for example, Congress) 
than under a regime in which such joint approval is required.  We also 
contend that a system of separated powers (whether mandatory or op-
tional) is better for voter welfare than one in which all political author-
ity in some policy domain is concentrated in one branch of govern-
ment.  The intuition for this result is that voters are better off when 
they can employ more nuanced electoral strategies.  When one actor    
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(say, the President) has unilateral authority in some policy domain, the 
voters have only one lever at their disposal: their electoral support for 
the actor with authority over the policy decision.  By contrast, under a 
mandatory separation of powers regime (for example, when both the 
President and Congress must agree to enact a new policy), the voters 
have two levers at their disposal: their electoral support for each of the 
two agents.  In a regime where one branch (for example, the President) 
may seek the permission of another branch (for example, Congress), 
but may also act unilaterally, the voters can assign the primary deci-
sionmaker different levels of electoral support depending not only on 
the ultimate outcome of the policy, but also on whether that branch 
acted unilaterally or with authorization from the other branch.  Thus, 
an optional separated powers system gives the voters three levers with 
which to calibrate their electoral strategies: electoral support for the 
President in the case of unilateral action, electoral support for the Pres-
ident in the case of joint action, and electoral support for Congress.6 
While our analysis focuses on the benefits to voters of increasing 
the number of ways a policy choice might be made, we recognize that 
this additional complexity also has costs.  As institutional complexity 
increases, voters are likely to face greater difficulty in attributing re-
sponsibility for policy decisions.  Thus, despite our central normative 
claim, we do not think that increasing the level of institutional com-
plexity or power diffusion will always benefit voters.  To put this point 
another way, adding more actors to the policymaking process has two 
effects on the efficacy of external electoral accountability, and these 
two effects cut in opposite directions.  On one hand, the participation 
of a greater number of elected agents in a policy decision enables vot-
ers to use more refined electoral strategies, so long as voters can assess 
not only the ultimate policy outcome, but also the process that led to 
that outcome.  On the other hand, the greater the complexity of the 
process and the larger the number of actors involved, the greater the 
informational burden on voters.  If this burden becomes too great, vot-
ers might not be able to correctly attribute responsibility for different 
decisions, and this may undermine electoral discipline as a constraint 
on incumbents. 
This latter “clarity-of-responsibility” effect has received more atten-
tion than the former effect,7 which is the subject of our analysis.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  6  Our model employs the simplifying assumption that Congress cannot enact the new policy 
unilaterally.  If it could, then voters would have a fourth lever of control — electoral support for 
Congress in case of unilateral (as opposed to joint) action. 
  7  See, e.g., Gersen, Unbundled Powers, supra note 4; Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidential-
ism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 51; Powell & Whitten, supra note 2; Thomas J. Rudolph, 
Institutional Context and the Assignment of Political Responsibility, 65 J. POL. 190 (2003); Ethan 
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While we acknowledge the clarity-of-responsibility problem — indeed, 
it is the principal reason why our analysis would not support the crea-
tion of an arbitrarily large number of government branches — we con-
jecture that this effect is not overwhelming in a simple separation of 
powers system with only two or three institutional actors.  We suggest 
that, at least for high-salience policy issues, the benefits to voters of be-
ing able to employ a more refined reward and punishment strategy ex-
ceed the informational costs associated with the added institutional 
complexity. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly reviews the existing 
literature on how separation of powers interacts with electoral accoun-
tability.  Part II elaborates our basic theoretical argument, and Part III 
outlines the argument’s main positive and normative implications.   
Part IV discusses some of the key assumptions and limitations of the 
analysis.  A brief conclusion follows.   
I.  SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ELECTORAL 
 ACCOUNTABILITY: AN OVERVIEW 
Political leaders are supposed to use the power of the state to pro-
mote the welfare of the citizenry, yet leaders may be tempted to pursue 
their own agenda or to serve parochial interests at the expense of   
public welfare.  Political systems may address this agency problem 
through two methods.  The first is competitive elections.  Elections can 
reduce agency slack in government in two ways.  First, voters can try 
to select “good types.”8  That is, voters may vote prospectively in order 
to put into office officials who are competent and who share the vot-
ers’ values.  Second, voters can try to sanction poor performance.9  
That is, voters may vote retrospectively, rewarding incumbents for 
good policy outcomes and punishing them for bad ones, in order to 
create stronger incentives for incumbent politicians to advance the 
voters’ interests. 
A second strategy for reducing political agency slack focuses on in-
stitutional separation of powers.  The classic Madisonian justification 
for the separation of powers is that ambition will counteract ambition, 
with the institutional and political rivalries between the branches of 
government serving to check the excesses or abuses of any one 
branch.10  There are numerous modern variants on this line of argu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Bueno de Mesquita & Dimitri Landa, An Equilibrium Theory of Clarity of Responsibility (Jan. 
22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  8  See Fearon, supra note 2, at 55–60. 
  9  See id.  See generally Ferejohn, supra note 2. 
  10  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3.  But cf. Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 950–53 (2005) (ob-
serving that electoral incentives of members of Congress often conflict with empire-building con-
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ment, but the essential idea is that the “principals” (the citizens) can 
mitigate the political agency problem by employing multiple agents 
whose potential biases are at least partially uncorrelated.11 
Separation of powers is sometimes characterized as a partial substi-
tute for electoral accountability.  That is, some contributions to consti-
tutional theory (in both the legal and the political economy fields) sug-
gest that robust electoral accountability obviates the need for an 
entrenched separation of powers, but reliance on separation of powers 
becomes necessary when electoral discipline is ineffective.12  Thus, 
James Madison argued in the Federalist Papers that although elections 
would be the “primary control” on government, separation of powers 
was an important “auxiliary precaution” in light of the imperfection of 
electoral control.13 
While there are undoubtedly cases in which electoral accountability 
and separation of powers act as substitutes in this way, the separation 
of powers constraints and electoral constraints may also complement 
one another.  Some strands of the literature have recognized this possi-
bility.  The existing claims regarding how the separation of powers re-
gime might affect the efficacy of electoral discipline can be divided 
loosely into two lines of argument, one more pessimistic about the im-
pact of separation of powers on electoral accountability, and the other 
more optimistic. 
The more pessimistic view emphasizes the so-called “clarity-of-
responsibility” problem.14  According to this view, diffusion of authori-
ty among multiple government actors makes it difficult for voters to 
figure out whom to blame or reward, thereby weakening electoral in-
centives across the board.  As a result, politicians may be excessively 
reluctant to undertake socially desirable policies because they will re-
ceive only a fraction of the credit.  Leading constitutional scholars and 
comparative political scientists, at least as far back as Woodrow Wil-
son, have invoked a version of this argument to claim that the Ameri-
can-style separation of powers hinders effective governance.15  T h e  
clarity-of-responsibility problem may also make politicians more likely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cerns); Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV. 993, 
1000 (2006) (same). 
  11  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 42–44. 
  12  See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of Powers and the Idea 
of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
293 (2005); Levinson, supra note 10, at 959–60; Persson et al., supra note 4. 
  13  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 290. 
  14  See sources cited supra note 7. 
  15  See W OODROW  WILSON,  CONGRESSIONAL  GOVERNMENT  281–82 (Transaction Pub-
lishers 2002) (15th ed. 1900) (“Each branch of the government is fitted out with a small section of 
responsibility, whose limited opportunities afford to the conscience of each many easy escapes.  
Every suspected culprit may shift the responsibility upon his fellows.”).    
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to take actions that benefit parochial interests at the expense of a ma-
jority of voters.  For example, Congress might delegate controversial 
or unpopular decisions to executive agencies, while continuing to influ-
ence these decisions behind the scenes, so as to deliver rents to special 
interest groups while blaming the agency for unpopular policies.16  
Another alleged example of this sort of blame-shifting involves at-
tempts by the federal government to induce or compel state govern-
ments to implement unpopular federal policies, thereby exploiting   
the federal structure of the government to evade electoral account- 
ability for these decisions.17  Those who emphasize the clarity-of-
responsibility problem tend to prefer Westminster-style parliamenta-
rianism or to welcome the ascent of strong political parties, or both.18   
The more optimistic view is that the separation of powers can im-
prove electoral accountability because the competition between the 
branches encourages disclosure of relevant information regarding the 
merits of different policy initiatives.  This variant on the classic Madi-
sonian argument emphasizes the ability of each branch of government 
to check the others by monitoring them and disclosing information to 
voters, thereby enhancing the efficacy of electoral discipline.19  Such 
monitoring and disclosure is especially likely when different branches 
are controlled by partisan political adversaries.20 
Both of the above lines of argument emphasize how the separation 
of powers might affect the efficacy of electoral accountability by alter-
ing the amount of information available to voters.  On the pessimistic 
account, separation of powers reduces information about true respon-
sibility because voters cannot figure out which agents were responsible 
for adopting or blocking a given policy.  On the optimistic account, se-
paration of powers increases voter information because rival branches 
have an incentive to supply such information.  Although these hypo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  16  See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 
56–62 (1982); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Admin-
istrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46–52 (1982); see also Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 
Bureaucrats or Politicians? (pt. 2), 92 J. PUB. ECON. 426 (2008).  
  17  See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 598 (2000) (ar-
guing that cooperative federalism programs “reduce political transparency[,] obscure political re-
sponsibility[,] and facilitate political blame-shifting” because the public can never be sure which 
level of government is responsible for failures in government programs).  
  18  See James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Govern-
ment in the United States, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 613, 616–31 (1988–1989) (summarizing the literature 
in support of united government); see also Linz, supra note 7; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Constitu-
tional Design and Citizen Electoral Control, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 107 (1989).     
  19  See Persson et al., supra note 4; cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of Presidential Gov-
ernment: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong To Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 
CONST. COMMENT. 51, 56–57 (2001); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: 
The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 300 (1996). 
  20  See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 2311 (2006).    
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theses are in tension with one another, both may capture important 
features of the real political world.  Nonetheless, we argue that these 
analyses are incomplete because they neglect another way that the in-
stitutional separation of powers might affect the efficacy of electoral 
discipline in reducing political agency slack: separation of powers — in 
particular, the participation of multiple, independently elected actors in 
the decision to enact a new policy — expands the set of observable po-
litical decisions on which voters can condition their electoral responses.  
This institutional feature facilitates rational retrospective voting by 
enabling voters to fine-tune their reward and punishment strategies.  
II.  HOW SEPARATION OF POWERS AFFECTS  
RATIONAL RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
When certain critical assumptions hold, voters can vary their ex 
post political-support level for incumbent government officials in order 
to induce better ex ante incentives with respect to policy choice.  Fur-
thermore, voters can exploit an institutional separation of powers to 
enhance the efficacy of this electoral strategy.  In Part IV, we elaborate 
the most important and problematic of the necessary assumptions and 
explain how and why they limit the domain of our argument.  Here, 
however, we lay out the basic theoretical argument, stating the key as-
sumptions as we go.21 
A.  The Baseline Case: A Single Elected Agent 
Consider a simple political system with a single elected agent — the 
President — who has the sole authority to make policy decisions.   
Elections supply the only external constraint on the President’s choic-
es; in this case, there is no separation of powers.  We will represent the 
electoral check by considering the behavior of a single representative 
voter, who might be thought of as the median voter in the electorate or 
some other pivotal voting bloc. 
Suppose that the President must decide whether to launch a mili-
tary attack on an unfriendly nation.  One might reasonably assume 
that the voter’s view on the desirability of the attack depends crucially 
on its expected outcome.  For simplicity, let us make the (unrealistic) 
assumption that the military intervention can lead to one of two possi-
ble outcomes: either the intervention is a “success” (a quick and deci-
sive victory over an adversary that posed a substantial threat) or a 
“failure” (a prolonged and costly military entanglement with a target 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  21  The discussion in this section is based on, and derived from, our more formal analysis in 
Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 4.  Readers interested in formal statement and proof of our 
more general propositions should consult that paper.  This Article illustrates our most important 
conclusions using numerical examples.      
628  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:617  
that turns out to have posed little threat).  Let us suppose, again arbi-
trarily and purely for expositional simplicity, that the voter would re-
ceive 1 unit of utility if the military intervention succeeds, 0 units of 
utility if the military intervention fails, and 0.5 units of utility if the 
government eschews military action. 
If it were known in advance whether the intervention would suc-
ceed or fail, the decision would be a trivial one from the voter’s pers-
pective.  But many policy decisions are more like lotteries: there is 
some probability they will succeed, but also some probability they will 
fail; so at the moment of decision, enacting the new policy is a gamble.  
Still, there are good gambles and bad gambles.  Given the simplifying 
assumptions stated above, the voter would favor military intervention 
if and only if the probability of success were greater than 50%.  There-
fore, if the voter knew the probability that the intervention would suc-
ceed, the problem would again be trivial: the voter could demand that 
the President launch an attack if this probability exceeded 50%, de-
mand that the President refrain from attacking if the probability of 
success were lower than 50%, and vote out of office any President who 
behaved inconsistently with these demands.  Likewise, if the President 
and the voter had identical preferences, the voter could always trust 
the President’s judgment. 
Let us suppose, however, that the voter is confronted with an agen-
cy problem: the President has better information than the voter about 
the true probability of success, and the President’s preferences might 
diverge from the voter’s.  We can incorporate the informational 
asymmetry in simplified form by assuming that the President knows 
the probability of success, but the voter does not.  The voter, instead, 
views any probability between 0% and 100% as equally likely.  Al-
though this radical information asymmetry is unrealistic, it captures 
the idea that political leaders often have access to information that is 
unavailable to the general public as well as greater capacity to trans-
late this information into something like a probability estimate. 
To capture the fact that the President’s policy preferences might 
diverge from those of the voter, let us suppose that there is some pa-
rochial interest group — say, arms dealers, oil companies, neo-
imperialists, or exiled dissidents from the potential target country — 
that has a stronger “taste” for military intervention than does the voter.  
Let us further suppose (arbitrarily) that there is a 25% probability that 
this interest group will succeed in “capturing” the President.  If the 
President is captured, then (again using arbitrary numbers) he gets 1.4 
units of utility from a successful intervention, 0.4 units of utility even 
from a failed intervention, and 0.5 units of utility from staying out.  If 
the interest group does not capture the President — if the President is 
“unbiased” — then the President’s utility payoffs are the same as the 
voter’s: 1 for success, 0.5 for nonintervention, and 0 for failure.    
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Let us next assume that after the President decides whether to at-
tack, and after the voter observes the outcome of any such attack, 
there is an election that pits the incumbent against some challenger.  
The benefit to the President of remaining in office is 1 unit of utility.  
A crucial assumption of our analysis is that the voter employs a ra-
tional retrospective voting strategy designed to induce optimal ex ante 
incentives for the President.22  In particular, the voter will reelect the 
President with some probability that depends entirely on the Presi-
dent’s prior policy choice and the observed outcome.  The voter thus 
uses the election as a way to reward or punish the President.  For in-
stance, suppose that a voter who observes a military success always 
reelects the President.  That strategy is equivalent to the voter reward-
ing the President with 1 unit of utility when the intervention succeeds.  
Alternatively, suppose that if the President opts for nonintervention, 
the voter’s probability of supporting the President’s reelection is 60%.  
That strategy is equivalent to the voter offering the President 0.6 units 
of utility if the President abstains from military action. 
What electoral strategy would be optimal for the voter under these 
assumptions?  If the voter knew for sure that the President was un-
biased, she could simply reelect the President regardless of the decision 
or outcome, since the President’s utility payoffs would be the same as 
the voter’s.  If the voter knew for certain that the President had been 
captured by the pro-war faction, she could ensure that the President 
takes the correct action by adopting the following electoral strategy: if 
the President launches a successful military intervention, always re-
elect the President; if the President launches a military intervention 
that fails, always replace the President; if the President takes no ac-
tion, reelect the President 90% of the time.  If the voter adopts this 
strategy, the President’s expected utility from nonintervention is 1.4 
units of utility: 0.5 units from the policy outcome and 0.9 units from 
the expected outcome of the election.  Further, the (captured) Presi-
dent’s utility from launching the invasion is the probability that the 
policy will succeed (expressed as a value between 0 and 1) times the 
total utility payoff from success (2 units, one from the success itself and 
the other from the guaranteed reelection), plus 0.4.  So, the President 
in this case will launch an invasion if, but only if, the ex ante probabil-
ity of success exceeds 50% — exactly what the voter would want.23 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  See infra section IV.A, pp. 647–49, for a discussion of this assumption. 
  23  Other voter strategies would also yield a similar result in this case, as all the voter needs to 
do is ensure that the biased President’s probability of reelection is forty percentage points lower if 
the President launches an invasion than if the President takes no action.  So, for example, the vot-
er could achieve the same result by reelecting the President with a 70% probability if the Presi-
dent takes no action and reelecting the President with a 30% probability if the President launches 
an attack, regardless of the outcome.  We focus in the main text on the case in which the voter 
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The problem for the voter, though, is that she is unsure whether the 
parochial interest group has succeeded in biasing the President in fa-
vor of war.  Let us continue to assume that the probability of capture 
is 25%.  If the voter were to reelect the President no matter what (the 
optimal strategy when the President is unbiased), then if the President 
is captured (an event with a 25% likelihood) and the probability of 
success is between 10% and 50% (which the voter anticipates will oc-
cur  40% of the time), the result is a “false positive”: the President 
launches a war even though a fully informed voter would prefer no ac-
tion.  In contrast, if the voter were to adopt the electoral strategy that 
is optimal in those cases in which the President is definitely captured, 
then in those cases where the President is in fact unbiased (true 75% of 
the time) and the probability of success is between 50% and 70% (true 
20% of the time), the voter’s aggressive electoral strategy will induce a 
“false negative,” deterring a military intervention that a fully informed 
voter would have favored. 
What should the voter do in this case?  It turns out that, under 
these simplifying assumptions, the voter would maximize her expected 
utility by adopting the following strategy: always reelect a President 
who launches a successful military intervention; never reelect a Presi-
dent who launches a failed military intervention; and reelect a Presi-
dent who takes no action 60% of the time.24  This electoral strategy 
means that an unbiased President will launch the attack if the ex ante 
probability of success exceeds 55%, while the captured President will 
launch the attack if the ex ante probability of success exceeds 35%.  
This strategy is not perfect: when the President is captured and the 
probability of success is between 35% and 50%, there will still be a 
false positive (that is, an unjustified invasion), and when the President 
is unbiased and the probability of success is between 50% and 55%, 
there will still be a false negative (that is, unjustified inaction).  But 
this is the best the voter can do under the circumstances.25 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
rewards success with reelection and punishes failure with replacement because, as we will see, 
these features characterize the voter’s optimal electoral strategy once we introduce some voter 
uncertainty about whether the President has been captured by the special interest faction. 
  24  The idea that the voter would always reelect a President whose policy initiative is success-
ful, and always throw out a President whose policy initiative is unsuccessful, may appear unrealis-
tic — which it is.  This result derives principally from the fact that in our simplified analysis, 
there is only one policy choice, and the decision to enact the new proposal results in an unambi-
guous success or failure.  In the real world, the basic dynamic we describe would be attenuated by 
the voter’s need to balance results on multiple issues and to assess conflicting evidence about poli-
cy performance.  The basic dynamic we outline, though, is still likely to be present. 
  25  More formally, we can define p as the President’s ex ante estimate of the probability (ex-
pressed as a value between 0 and 1, rather than in percentage points) that military intervention 
will succeed; define q as the probability that the President is biased; and define b as the additional 
utility units a biased President derives from initiating military action.  In the numerical example 
given in the text, p is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, q = 0.25, and b = 0.4.  
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Observe that the voter’s electoral strategy is asymmetric, in that the 
political “blame” for failure (defined as the difference between the 
President’s probability of winning reelection in the case of inaction 
and his probability of winning reelection in the case of policy failure) is 
greater than the political “credit” for policy success (defined analogous-
ly as the difference between the President’s probability of winning re-
election after policy success and the probability of winning reelection 
following inaction).  Thus defined, the magnitude of “blame for fail-
ure” (in utility units) is 0.6 (0.6 minus 0), while “credit for success” is 
0.4 ( 1 minus 0.6).  The reason for this asymmetry is that the voter 
knows the President may be biased in favor of intervention, and the 
voter partially offsets this risk by increasing the relative attractiveness 
to the President of inaction.26 
B.  The Impact of Separation of Powers 
 on Electoral Strategies and Political Behavior 
The voter’s behavior in the case of a unitary policymaker establish-
es a baseline case.  What if there is a separation of powers?  Let us 
suppose that Congress must approve any proposed military interven-
tion in order for it to go forward.  (We bracket collective choice com-
plications by representing Congress as a single entity, which we might 
think of as the pivotal member of Congress.)  Let us further suppose 
that the parochial pro-war interest group will try to capture both the 
President and Congress.  The effect of capture is the same — the value 
to a captured branch of going to war increases by 0.4 units of utility — 
and the probability that the interest group will capture either branch is 
25%.  However, we will assume that these probabilities of capture are 
statistically independent, such that the probability the faction captures 
both the President and Congress is 6.25%.27  Our model thus incorpo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
As we show in Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 4, the median voter’s optimal electoral strategy 
in this case is to reelect the President if the intervention succeeds, replace the President if the in-
tervention fails, and reelect the President with probability 0.5 + qb, which in this example is equal 
to 0.6.  The unbiased President’s optimal strategy, in response to this anticipated behavior by the 
voters, is to take military action if, but only if, p (the probability of success) is greater than   
0.5 + (qb/2), which in this example is equal to 0.55.  The biased President, by contrast, launches 
the invasion if the probability of success is greater than 0.5 – ((1 – q)b/2), here equal to 0.35.  We 
further show that the median voter’s expected utility in this case, when all players use their op-
timal strategies, can be expressed as 5/8 – q(1 – q)b
2/8, which in this numerical example yields an 
expected utility to the voter of 0.62125. 
  26  If the voter fears that the incumbent President might be too dovish rather than too hawkish, 
the asymmetry would run in the other direction.  Our discussion here focuses on the case where 
the President may be too hawkish, but the analysis is basically the same in the opposite case. 
  27  The assumption of complete statistical independence is obviously a simplification, but as 
long as the probabilities of capture are not perfectly correlated, our central qualitative results will 
hold.  Because our model considers only the capture of both political branches by an interest 
group in favor of the policy, we do not discuss issues related to the distinctions between unified 
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rates, in stylized form, a classic Madisonian argument in favor of the 
separation of powers: it is more difficult for a faction to capture two 
branches of government than to capture only one.  Finally, we assume 
that although voters are uncertain whether a politician has been cap-
tured, each politician is aware of the preferences and motives of other 
politicians.28   
How would a rational voter behave under these conditions?  First, 
the voter would impose asymmetric punishments and rewards on the 
President in order to partially offset the risk of a hawkish bias, but this 
asymmetry would be less pronounced than in the baseline case of un-
ilateral presidential authority.  Specifically, the probability the voter 
reelects the President remains 100% when the intervention succeeds 
and 0% when the intervention fails, but the probability of reelection in 
the case of inaction is now (approximately) 53% (down from 60% in 
the baseline unilateral authority case).  Thus, political blame for failure 
is now 0.53, while credit for success is now 0.47 — still asymmetric, 
but less so than the 0.6–0.4 difference in the unilateral case.  Mean-
while, the voter does not introduce any asymmetry with respect to 
Congress’s rewards and punishments for policy success or failure.   
That is, the voter would let Congress make whatever decision it wants, 
without using electoral incentives to influence Congress’s decision.   
This electoral strategy yields a higher expected utility for the voter 
than in the unilateral authority case.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and divided government.  If we assume, however, that because of divided government Congress 
and the President may be biased in opposite directions, then it would be important to know which 
party controlled which branches of government.  The working paper version of our companion 
piece considers such an extension, but the results in that paper do not alter our main conclusion.  
See Matthew C. Stephenson & Jide Nzelibe, Political Accountability Under Alternative Institu-
tional Regimes 20–23 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion 
Paper No. 615, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152452.   
  28  Like many of our other assumptions, this simplification is unrealistic, but we think it cap-
tures in stark form an important feature of the real political world.  As participants in the policy-
making process, politicians from both branches of government have the opportunity to acquire 
information about each other’s true preferences.  Voters, by contrast, often do not have the re-
sources or incentives to observe closely the complexities and intricacies of the behind-the-scenes 
bargaining that drives policy output. 
  29  More precisely, as we show in Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 4, in this regime the me-
dian voter’s optimal strategy is to reelect the incumbent President and Congress with certainty if 
the intervention succeeds; to replace both of them if the intervention fails; and if no intervention 
occurs (that is, if the President does not propose it or if Congress blocks it), to reelect Congress 
with probability 0.5 and to reelect the President with probability 1/2 + q
2b/(q
2 – q + 1), which in 
this example (where q = 0.25 and b = 0.4) is approximately equal to 0.53.  Given this anticipated 
electoral behavior by the voter, the unbiased President launches the invasion if and only if   
p > 1/2 + q
2b/[2(q
2 – q + 1)] (here approximately equal to 0.515).  Conversely, the biased President 
invades if and only if p > 1/2 – (1 – q)b/[2(q
2 – q + 1)]  (here approximately equal to 0.315); an un-
biased Congress approves a presidential proposal to invade if p > 1/2, while a biased Congress 
approves such a proposal if p > (1 – b)/2 (here equal to 0.3).  When the voter uses this electoral 
strategy and the President and Congress respond rationally, then the voter’s expected utility 
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The reason the voter relaxes the asymmetry in the President’s elec-
toral rewards and punishments is that the voter expects Congress to 
screen out some of the President’s undesirable policy initiatives.  More 
specifically, if the President is biased but Congress is not, the voter is 
better off under a separation of powers, as Congress will block all in-
itiatives that the captured President would favor but a fully informed 
voter would oppose.  In this scenario, distortions in the voter’s elector-
al strategy are not necessary to check the President.  Of course, if the 
President and Congress are both captured, the voter is worse off than 
she would have been with a more asymmetric electoral strategy, but 
this dual capture occurs relatively infrequently.  If the President is un-
biased, then the modest asymmetry in voter rewards and punishments 
will overdeter the President from taking action in some cases, but this 
overdeterrence problem is less acute than in the case of unilateral pres-
idential authority because the asymmetry in the voter’s electoral strat-
egy is less extreme. 
Now, consider what happens in the case in which the President 
may seek congressional approval for the military intervention but may 
also choose to act unilaterally.30  What is the voter’s optimal strategy 
in this case?  As was true in the preceding cases, a rational voter 
would use electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk that the 
parochial interest group has biased the government in favor of war.  In 
this case, though, there are two ways that the government might reach 
the decision to go to war.  First, the President might propose military 
intervention to Congress, which Congress then approves.  Second, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
payoff can be expressed as 5/8 – q
2(1 – q)b
2/[8(q
2 – q + 1)], which in this example is equal to ap-
proximately 0.62385, which is greater than the voter’s expected utility in the baseline case of un-
ilateral authority by approximately 0.00260 units.  The magnitude of this difference may appear 
small, but it is worth keeping in mind that these numerical values are arbitrary, as are the as-
sumptions about the values and distributions of the other variables in the example, so it is hard to 
interpret things like voter utility payoffs as “small” or “large” in absolute terms.  What matters is 
the relative expected utility payoff under different regimes. 
  30  This “optional” separation of powers model corresponds to a number of real-world situa-
tions, such as our running military intervention example.  While the Constitution vests the power 
to declare war in Congress, it makes the President the Commander in Chief.  As a practical mat-
ter, this means that while the President can seek congressional authorization for his initiatives, he 
sometimes initiates military action unilaterally, and for a variety of reasons it is difficult for Con-
gress to constrain such unilateral initiatives.  Cf. Nzelibe, supra note 4, at 913–14 (elaborating on 
the “electoral disincentives that members of Congress might face in constraining the President’s 
military initiatives,” id. at 913).  An optional separation of powers may also capture certain as-
pects of domestic policy, as when the President can advance his policy agenda by pushing legisla-
tion through Congress, but can also initiate administrative agency action in ways that do not re-
quire congressional authorization (and which are practically difficult for Congress to overturn).  
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,  114 H ARV. L. REV.  2245,  2341 ( 2001).  More 
broadly, Professors Terry Moe and William Howell have highlighted numerous ways in which the 
President can advance his policy agenda unilaterally.  See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, 
The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999).    
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President might authorize military intervention unilaterally, without 
going to Congress or (equivalently for purposes of this analysis) over 
congressional objection.  Likewise, there are two ways the government 
might reach the decision not to go to war.  First, the President might 
decline to propose military action.  Second, the President might pro-
pose intervention to Congress, face congressional opposition, and back 
down. 
The fact that there are different ways that the government might 
select each of the two possible policy decisions is important because it 
enables the voter to condition her electoral support for the President 
and Congress not only on the policy choice (war/no war), but also on 
the manner in which that policy was selected.  Thus, using the (arbi-
trary) numbers from the previous examples, the voter’s optimal elec-
toral strategy is as follows: if the government initiates a military inter-
vention that succeeds, reelect both the President and Congress with 
certainty; if the government initiates a military intervention that fails, 
replace both the President and Congress with certainty; if the Presi-
dent declines to propose military action, reelect the incumbent Presi-
dent and Congress with 50% probability; if the President proposes mil-
itary action, Congress opposes it, and the President then backs down, 
reelect the President with 90% probability and reelect Congress with 
54% probability.  The voter’s expected utility in this example is higher 
than in the baseline case of unilateral presidential authority, and it is 
also higher than in the case in which congressional approval was re-
quired.31  The voter’s strategy under this “optional” separation of pow-
ers regime has several notable features: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  Formally, the voter under this regime would adopt the following strategy: if the President 
initiates military action unilaterally, without congressional assent or over congressional objection, 
reelect the President if the intervention succeeds and replace the President if the intervention fails; 
if the President and Congress jointly approve military action, reelect both if the intervention suc-
ceeds and replace both if the intervention fails; if the President does not propose military inter-
vention, reelect the President with 50% probability; if the President proposes military intervention 
to Congress, Congress disapproves, and the President relents, reelect the President with probabil-
ity 1/2 + b (here equal to 0.9) and reelect Congress with probability 1/2 + q
2b/[q
2 + (1 – q)
2] (here 
equal to 0.54).  If the voter uses this electoral strategy, an unbiased Congress would approve a 
proposed military intervention if p > 1/2 + q
2b/[2(q
2 + (1 – q)
2)] (here equal to 0.52), while a biased 
Congress would approve a military intervention if p > 1/2 – (1 – q)
2b/[2(q
2 + (1 – q)
2)] (here equal to 
0.32).  An unbiased President, anticipating this behavior by the voter and by Congress, proposes 
the policy to Congress if p > 1/2 and Congress is expected to approve the policy, or if Congress is 
expected to veto the policy and p ≤ (1 + b)/2 (here equal to 0.7).  The unbiased President refrains 
from proposing military action if Congress is expected to approve such a proposal but p < 1/2 and 
the unbiased President unilaterally initiates military intervention if Congress would veto a pro-
posal but p > (1 + b)/2 (here equal to 0.7).  The biased President proposes the policy to Congress if 
Congress is expected to approve and p > (1 – b)/2 (here equal to 0.3) or if Congress is expected to 
veto the proposal and p ≤ 1/2.  The biased President takes no action if Congress would approve a 
proposal but p < (1 – b)/2 (here equal to 0.3), and the biased President acts unilaterally if Congress 
is expected to veto a proposal but p > 1/2. 
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First, it guarantees that if the President prefers not to intervene, 
and knows that Congress also opposes intervention, the President will 
“posture” by proposing military action, provoking congressional oppo-
sition, and then “respecting” that opposition by eschewing unilateral 
action.  Perhaps nonintuitively, this sequence of decisions substantially 
increases the President’s reelection probability over the baseline in 
which the President makes no proposal (from 50% to 90%).  Note that 
a corollary to this observation is that if the President prefers not to in-
tervene but anticipates Congress would approve a proposed interven-
tion, the President would not propose intervention.  Otherwise, he 
would be stuck between a rock and a hard place, having either to 
launch a military attack that he views as too militarily or politically 
risky, or to back down from his own proposal without the political 
“cover” of congressional opposition. 
Second, the strategy outlined above makes the President’s political 
rewards and punishments for unilateral action extremely asymmetric, 
while there is no asymmetry at all if the President secures congression-
al approval: if the President acts unilaterally or over congressional op-
position, a policy success increases the President’s probability of reelec-
tion by only 10 percentage points over the baseline case in which the 
President acquiesces in the face of congressional opposition (from 90% 
to 100%), while a policy failure causes the President’s reelection prob-
ability to plummet from the baseline probability of 90% to 0%.  By 
contrast, if the President secures congressional approval for a military 
intervention, then the political rewards and punishments for success 
and failure are symmetric: if the President acts with congressional ap-
proval, a success increases the President’s probability of reelection by 
50 percentage points over the baseline case in which the President re-
frains from military action (from 50% to 100%), while a policy failure 
causes the President’s reelection probability to decrease by an equiva-
lent amount (from 50% to 0%). 
Third, in addition to manipulating the President’s incentives, the 
voter in this scenario also manipulates Congress’s incentives, using an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
    Given these strategies, the voter’s expected utility is 5/8 – q
2(1 – q)
2b
2/[8(q
2 + (1 – q)
2)], which 
in this example is equal to 0.62388.  This expected utility payoff is higher than the payoff under 
either the unilateral authority regime or the regime in which congressional approval of the Presi-
dent’s proposal was mandatory.  This optional separation of powers regime is always the best of 
the three for the voter, as we demonstrate formally in Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 4, and as 
we discuss further in section III.D.  In our numerical example, the expected utility difference be-
tween the optional and mandatory separation of powers regimes seems very small — only about 
0.00003 units of expected utility — but as noted earlier, see supra note 29, the artificial assump-
tions used to simplify the numerical example make it difficult to interpret this difference as “large” 
or “small” in real-world terms.  In our view, what is more interesting is the relative ranking of 
these different regimes in terms of expected voter utility.  For a more general and formal treat-
ment, see Stephenson & Nzelibe, supra note 4.     
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asymmetric electoral strategy to make congressional opposition to a 
presidential proposal more attractive.  This asymmetry, however, is 
relatively mild: if Congress approves a successful military intervention, 
Congress’s reelection probability increases by 46 percentage points 
over the baseline reelection probability of 54% that would obtain if 
Congress opposed the President’s proposal; if Congress approves a 
failed military intervention, Congress’s reelection probability drops 54 
percentage points (from 54% to 0%).  The voter imposes this asymme-
try because the voter is concerned that Congress might be biased in 
favor of military intervention.  The asymmetry is relatively mild be-
cause congressional bias matters only if the hawkish interest group 
succeeds in capturing both the President and Congress — something 
that the voter expects to occur relatively infrequently (only 6.25% of 
the time). 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The preceding discussion is based on a highly simplified (though 
not, alas, simple) model of political behavior.  The purpose of this sty-
lized analysis is not to provide a nuanced or comprehensive account of 
real-world political behavior — if it were, it would be a hopeless fail-
ure.  Rather, this abstract analysis is meant to sharpen and refine our 
intuitions about strategic political behavior, as well as to suggest novel 
hypotheses, which we can then carry with us when we turn to consid-
eration of real-world cases.  In this Part, we examine the implications 
of our analysis for several ongoing debates in the literature on constitu-
tional theory and institutional design.  We focus on four salient ques-
tions: (1) whether presidents relentlessly seek to expand their own 
power when they have the ability to do so; (2) whether separation of 
powers induces undesirable responsibility shifting by the political 
branches; (3) whether separation of powers produces gridlock (or “sta-
tus quo bias”); and (4) what form of separation of powers best ad-
vances voter welfare.  For each of these questions, our stylized theoret-
ical analysis suggests novel conclusions that run against the grain of 
much of the received wisdom on these topics. 
Although we lack the evidence we would need to test our hypo-
theses, we illustrate several of our arguments with real-world exam-
ples, drawn principally though not exclusively from decisions regard-
ing the use of military force.  Use-of-force decisions are appropriate 
test cases for our hypotheses for three reasons.  First, the role of Con-
gress often varies across conflicts.  Second, use-of-force decisions are 
highly salient policy decisions, and their outcomes often affect the po-   
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litical survival of presidents.32  Third, presidential military engage-
ments are rife with speculation about political bias, including concerns 
that presidents might deploy high-minded nationalist rhetoric to cloak 
risky military initiatives that serve narrow partisan, parochial, or per-
sonal interests.33  While our analysis of selected examples is far from 
conclusive, these examples suggest that our stylized theoretical argu-
ments may capture important aspects of real-world political behavior. 
A.  Presidential Empire Building 
Contemporary critics of Madison’s vision of institutional balancing 
often argue that presidents undermine this balance by pressing for ex-
pansions of their power, which Congress is unwilling or unable to re-
strain.34  On this view, presidents are “empire builders” who resist 
sharing power with Congress unless forced to do so.  Others have ex-
pressed skepticism about this empire-building hypothesis.35  Our anal-
ysis lends further support to the skeptical view by highlighting the fact 
that presidents will sometimes see power-sharing with Congress as a 
valuable mechanism for reducing political risk.  The logic is simple: 
because of the voter’s asymmetric strategy, the President faces differ-
ent, and more severe, electoral risks when he acts unilaterally or oth-
erwise pushes the boundaries of his authority.  Thus, we should expect 
presidents to prefer collaborating with Congress on highly visible is-
sues that entail a significant risk of policy failure.  Such collaboration 
comes at a cost, of course, especially since Congress might reject the 
President’s initiatives.  Our analysis is sensitive to this cost, and indeed 
our analysis predicts that presidents will sometimes prefer unilateral 
action because of it.  But our analysis also predicts that because presi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  32  See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Randolph M. Siverson, War and the Survival of Political 
Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability, 89 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 841 (1995); see also Timothy Y.C. Cotton, War and American Democracy: Electoral Costs of 
the Last Five Wars, 30 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 616, 619, 632 (1986) (finding that unpopular wars 
have had a detrimental effect on elected officials from the initiating President’s party). 
  33  For instance, President Clinton was accused of using attacks against alleged al Qaeda tar-
gets in Sudan in 1998 to deflect attention from scandals concerning his personal life.  Similarly, 
President Bush has been blamed for embarking on the 2003 invasion of Iraq to benefit political 
allies in the oil industry, or simply to avenge personal grievances. 
  34  See Moe & Howell, supra note 30, at 134–35 (“[P]residents have strong incentives to push 
this [constitutional] ambiguity relentlessly . . . to expand their own powers, and . . . for reasons 
rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them.”); 
see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Kagan, supra 
note 30, at 2341; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
865 (2007); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006).  
  35  For a leading, thoroughgoing critique, see Levinson, supra note 10.  See also JOHN HART 
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993).    
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dents have a powerful political incentive to seek congressional acquies-
cence, they will often do so. 
Of course, the hypothesis that presidents will voluntarily share 
power is difficult to evaluate empirically because it is hard to tell 
whether presidential consultation with Congress is truly “voluntary” 
(and for purposes of reducing political risk), or whether it is due to ex-
ternally imposed institutional constraints.  Nevertheless, apparent self-
constraint by the executive branch occurs frequently enough to raise 
questions about the assumption that presidents invariably prefer unila-
teral action if given the choice.  For example, although there is wide-
spread agreement that presidents have considerable latitude to act un-
ilaterally in national security matters,36 presidents have routinely 
sought congressional authorization for their military initiatives even 
when they were not legally compelled to do so.37  Furthermore, mod-
ern presidents continue to avail themselves of the Article II treaty pro-
cedure, which requires a two-thirds majority vote from the Senate for 
binding international commitments, even though as a practical matter 
this procedure is both unnecessary and increases the chance of legisla-
tive defeat.38 
Professors David Samuels and Matthew Shugart’s comparative 
study of presidentialism lends further support to the view that presi-
dents often have strong electoral incentives to share power.  Samuels 
and Shugart find that strong presidents tend to seek broad coalition 
cabinets in order to link legislators with policy programs.39  Such coali-
tion-building, they argue, “is a means of making congress more co-
responsible for national governance than would otherwise be the case, 
given the high presidential legislative authority.”40  Although Samuels 
and Shugart emphasize the President’s need to diffuse responsibility, 
presidents in such systems may benefit politically from coalition cabi-
nets because such cabinets are likely to screen out policy initiatives 
that are biased against the voters’ interests, which in turn reduces the 
political consequences of policy failure. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  36  See Moe & Howell, supra note 30, at 161–62. 
  37  See Nzelibe, supra note 4, at 919; see also David P. Auerswald & Peter F. Cowhey, Ballot-
box Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505, 
507 (1997) (finding that since the passage of the War Powers Resolution, presidents rarely deploy 
troops for more than sixty days without congressional authorization). 
  38  See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling 
Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440, 445–47 (2005) (describing other strategic reasons why 
the President may seek to use treaties rather than executive agreements); John K. Setear, The 
President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway: Article II, Congressional-
Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5 (2002) (same).   
  39  See Samuels & Shugart, supra note 4, at 51.  
  40  Id.    
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If electoral incentives often motivate presidents to share authority 
with Congress, what normative or doctrinal implications follow?  One 
tentative conclusion is that giving the President some flexibility — 
perhaps by creating some ambiguity as to whether or when the Presi-
dent must seek congressional approval — is less likely to result in ex-
cessive concentration of decisionmaking authority in the President 
than the traditional empire-building view would predict.  That said, 
we do not mean to advance the naïve suggestion that judicial or con-
gressional intervention is never appropriate in the context of separa-
tion of powers disputes.  Exclusive reliance on electoral sanctions will 
often fail to generate the correct mix of incentives for the President.  
Our more modest argument is that mindfulness of the electoral deter-
rent to presidential concentration of power may, in some important 
subset of cases, alter our conclusions about the necessity or advisabili-
ty of strict, externally enforced limits on the President’s power to act  
unilaterally.  
B.  Responsibility Shifting 
The preceding section focused on one critique of the separation of 
powers: that it is ineffective because presidents have both the ability 
and the incentive to arrogate more power to themselves.  Our analysis 
suggests that concern may be exaggerated because rational voters can 
give presidents an electoral incentive to share decisionmaking authori-
ty with Congress.  That observation, though, might raise a different 
concern about the separation of powers that is also prominent in the 
literature: that U.S.-style separation of powers undermines democratic 
accountability by obscuring responsibility for policy outcomes.41  Ac-
cording to one variant of this hypothesis, politicians have both the op-
portunity and the incentive to exploit the separation of powers to con-
fuse or obscure responsibility for difficult decisions, enabling the 
politicians to claim credit for policy successes and to avoid blame for 
policy failures.42  Thus, Congress might seek to delegate to the courts 
or to administrative agencies,43 or (as suggested in the preceding sec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  41  See supra pp. 625–26.  
  42  See Powell & Whitten, supra note 2; Rudolph, supra note 7, at 196; R. Kent Weaver, The 
Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 372, 387–88 (1986); see also Charles O. Jones, 
The Diffusion of Responsibility: An Alternative Perspective for National Policy Politics in the US, 
4 GOVERNANCE 150 (1991).  Some commentators have argued that such blame-evasion strategies 
become particularly pronounced during periods of divided government.  See, e.g., Sundquist, su-
pra note 18, at 630 (observing that the President will tend to blame the opposition during divided 
government for policy failures like the deficit whereas the majority party in Congress will tend to 
blame the President). 
  43  See Aranson et al., supra note 16 (discussing strategic legislation delegation to agencies); Al-
berto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Why Do Politicians Delegate? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11531, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11531 (same); cf. Eli 
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tion) the President might seek congressional authorization as political 
insurance for some of his high-risk policy initiatives.44 
Our analysis suggests an alternative, and more optimistic, explana-
tion for behavior that superficially looks like “responsibility shifting” or 
“blame avoidance.”  Rather than being the result of voter confusion or 
uncertainty about political responsibility, such behavior may in fact re-
flect a rational political response to voters’ electoral strategies.  In our 
framework, voters manipulate the incentives of an agenda setter (like 
the President) to discourage excessive unilateral action and to encour-
age the agenda setter to seek the assent of other agents before under-
taking controversial policy initiatives.  Politicians who respond to these 
incentives by sharing power are not “fooling” the voters about respon-
sibility for policy; on the contrary, they are responding to voter strate-
gies designed to reduce political agency slack.  Understood this way, 
our framework helps explain (1) why the President (or other agenda 
setter) can reduce his political risk by seeking and obtaining the ap-
proval of another government branch, but will dramatically increase 
his political risk if he acts unilaterally;45 and (2) why the President (or 
other agenda setter) may sometimes “posture” by proposing actions he 
does not actually want to take, compelling another branch to state its 
opposition.46 
As an empirical matter, presidential use-of-force decisions, and the 
political response to them, are broadly consistent with our argument.  
Although presidents sometimes act unilaterally, they frequently seek 
congressional approval, and when they do, the adverse political fallout 
from interventions that go bad is lessened.  Of course, seeking congres-
sional authorization does not ensure that a President and his party will 
not suffer any backlash from a failed military engagement; the Presi-
dent is the agenda setter in national security issues and bears the bulk 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have 
an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349 (1993) (discussing strategic legislative 
delegation to courts).  However, a significant weakness in the blame-deflection theory of delega-
tion to courts and independent agencies is that it assumes an electorate sophisticated enough to 
recognize the delegation, but not sophisticated enough to recognize the delegator’s complicity in it.  
See Matthew C. Stephenson, “When The Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Indepen-
dent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 62–63 (2003). 
  44  See Nzelibe, supra note 4.  
  45  See Jones, supra note 42, at 150–55. 
  46  The latter observation is broadly consistent with the claim by Professors Tim Groseclose 
and Nolan McCarty that an agenda setter can improve its standing by proposing policies that are 
vetoed, because doing so makes the agenda setter look moderate and the veto player look more 
extreme.  See Groseclose & McCarty, supra note 4.  The causal mechanism in our framework is 
different, however.  Voters in our analysis do not acquire additional information about the Presi-
dent’s type.  Rather, in our analysis voters provide greater support in order to offset the Presi-
dent’s incentives to embark on unilateral action.      
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of the blame for military failure.47  Nonetheless, presidents typically 
suffer much more adverse political consequences from unpopular mili-
tary engagements when the President initiated the engagement without 
congressional support.48  That said, the fact that presidents can reduce 
their exposure to political risk is only marginally helpful in comparing 
our hypothesis about voter-induced decisionmaking to the more con-
ventional clarity-of-responsibility argument, since with respect to the 
political consequences to the President of policy failure, these compet-
ing hypotheses make observationally equivalent predictions.  How can 
we assess whether seeking the involvement of another branch is a way 
for politicians to evade voter discipline, as the conventional clarity-of-
responsibility hypothesis suggests, or whether this responsibility-
shifting behavior is actually induced by voter discipline, as our alter-
native framework suggests? 
The short answer is that we cannot, at least not with the existing 
data, but we can find some suggestive evidence by looking at the polit-
ical consequences to the President when the President acts unilaterally 
and the policy outcome is generally viewed as a success.  If the clarity-
of-responsibility hypothesis is correct, the President’s increased down-
side risk when a unilateral intervention fails ought to be offset by po-
litical rewards of roughly equivalent magnitude when a unilateral in-
tervention succeeds.  In contrast, if the reduction in political blame is 
due to a rational voter strategy designed to increase incentives for joint 
as opposed to unilateral action, then the President’s political benefit from 
unilateral policy success ought to be relatively modest compared to the 
blame the President would suffer in the event of unilateral policy failure. 
While we are cautious about making any broad conclusions, there 
are at least some cases that seem to conform more closely to the latter 
prediction.  Take, for instance, President Clinton’s NATO-led inter-
vention in Kosovo in March 1999.49  Congress never formally ap-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  47  See Cotton, supra note 32, at 630–33 (observing that voters punished Democratic presiden-
tial candidates more than they punished Democratic members of Congress during the Vietnam 
and Korean wars); Nzelibe, supra note 4, at 924. 
  48  Contrast, for example, the Democrats’ rather tepid response to the unpopular, but congres-
sionally authorized Iraq occupation in 2004, with President Truman’s experience during the unau-
thorized Korean War.  Once that war started to become unpopular, Truman was besieged by the 
political opposition and saw his public approval ratings slip to the twenties.  See WILLIAM G. 
HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 12–13 (2007) (describing congressional reaction to Truman’s deci-
sion to intervene in Korea).  Moreover, voter disillusionment with Truman’s war efforts also con-
tributed in part to Eisenhower’s dramatic electoral landslide in 1952.  Id. 
  49  For a brief factual background of the Kosovo intervention, in which President Clinton or-
dered air strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo in order to protect ethnic Albanians from Ser-
bian aggression, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  For an analysis of the 
international law and constitutional implications of the Kosovo intervention, see John C. Yoo, 
Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (2000).     
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proved the Kosovo operation, and President Clinton justified his unila-
teral action as an exercise of his constitutional authority as chief execu-
tive and Commander in Chief.50  But while the Kosovo intervention 
was largely judged a success by the popular media,51 Clinton’s ap-
proval ratings did not budge, and President Clinton failed to reap any 
palpable political benefits from the intervention.52  While we cannot 
observe the counterfactual world in which the result differed, public 
commentary during the period suggests that President Clinton’s ap-
proval ratings would have declined dramatically had the intervention 
ended in a stalemate or failure.53 
Even when presidents enjoy popular support from successful unila-
teral interventions, such support is often short-lived and rarely trans-
ferable to their other foreign policy initiatives.  President Reagan’s un-
ilateral intervention in Grenada is a case in point.  President Reagan 
ordered the intervention on the Caribbean island on October 25, 1983, 
approximately two days after the bombing of the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon — a tragedy that left 241 U.S. servicemen dead and dozens 
injured.54  Given the unfavorable domestic political climate surround-
ing the Beirut bombings, initial congressional criticism of the Grenada 
intervention was pronounced, with even key congressional Republi-
cans publicly expressing strong misgivings.55  But as the spectacle of 
rescued American medical students filled television screens in the wake 
of the intervention, President Reagan’s favorable opinion polls tempo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  50  See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1 PUB. PAPERS 459 (Mar. 26, 1999).  
President Clinton received some congressional political insurance when the Senate (but not the 
House) passed a resolution the day before he ordered the attack authorizing the President to con-
duct military air operations in conjunction with other NATO forces.  S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. 
(1999).  The House rejected the Senate resolution authorizing the conflict by a tie vote of 213–213.  
Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.  Moreover, the House also rejected a resolution providing for the decla-
ration of war by a vote of 427–2.  Id.; see H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong. (1999). 
  51  See, e.g., Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 114.  
  52  MATTHEW  A.  BAUM,  SOFT  NEWS  GOES  TO  WAR  328  n.8 (2003) (“President Clinton’s 
public approval remained flat following NATO’s victory in Kosovo.”). 
  53  See, e.g., The Capital Gang (CNN television broadcast June 5, 1999) (statement of Margaret 
Carlson) (“[The potential benefit of a NATO victory is] not as big a plus as it would have been a 
minus [if the intervention had failed].”); see also Jane Perlez, Clinton's Quandary: No Approach To 
End War Is Fast or Certain of Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1999, at A16.  Also, after sidestep-
ping staunch Republican opposition in Congress, the Clinton Administration went to great 
lengths to forestall any political fallout from the Kosovo intervention by making casualty avoid-
ance a political priority.  See BAUM, supra note 52, at 286–87; see also WESLEY K. CLARK, WAG-
ING MODERN WAR 419 (2001) (observing that the Kosovo intervention was characterized by “the 
exclusive reliance on [high-tech] airpower, the reluctance to accept friendly casualties, the horror 
of civilian casualties on any side, . . . and the impact of the media”).   
  54  Joel Brinkley, House Study Finds Officers at Fault in Beirut Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 1983, at A1. 
  55  Nzelibe, supra note 10, at 1037 (discussing the opposition to the Grenada invasion by cer-
tain Republican legislators).    
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rarily soared.56  The intervention also had a brief spillover effect: Pres-
ident Reagan enjoyed a bump in the polls for the Lebanon deploy-
ment.  But the euphoria surrounding the intervention fizzled by early 
1984.57  Any illusions that the successful Grenada intervention would 
help shore up support for the Lebanon deployment were put to rest 
shortly thereafter.58 
Again, we are not suggesting that presidents will never obtain sub-
stantial political credit for their unilateral military initiatives.  Indeed, 
our stylized analysis in Part II implies that the President will some-
times act unilaterally, over congressional opposition, when he has the 
option to do so, and will receive some political benefit when he does so 
and the outcome is deemed a success.  That said, our analysis implies 
that, given the increased political risks associated with unilateral mili-
tary initiatives, presidents are unlikely to embark on such initiatives 
unless they involve relatively low-stakes situations in which the public 
has little interest, or the President anticipates both congressional oppo-
sition and a very high likelihood of military success.59  While the exist-
ing evidence does not clearly distinguish our hypothesis from the more 
familiar versions of the responsibility-shifting argument, our analysis 
does offer a different — and more optimistic — account for behavior 
patterns that look like responsibility shifting. 
C.  Gridlock 
We have shown how our analysis suggests a guardedly optimistic 
response to two common critiques of the separation of powers — that 
separation of powers is ineffective, because the President has incen-
tives to expand his own authority that cannot be effectively checked, 
and that separation of powers undermines accountability by enabling 
political actors to obscure responsibility for policy decisions.  We now 
consider yet a third common critique of U.S.-style separation of pow-
ers: that additional checks and balances — in the lingo of contempo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  56  Id. at 1038. 
  57  In a January 1984 Gallup poll, about 52% of the respondents said they thought it was a mis-
take for the United States to send the Marines to Lebanon, in contrast to 45% in the immediate 
aftermath of the Grenada intervention.  See THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1984, at 21–
22 (1985). 
  58  By early 1984, Democratic members of Congress started introducing legislation that would 
ostensibly cut off funding for the deployment in Lebanon.  See Nzelibe, supra note 10, at 1031–32; 
see also Steven V. Roberts, House Democrats Draft Resolution on Beirut Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 1984, at A1.  Under congressional pressure, President Reagan formally ended the Ameri-
can deployment in Lebanon in March 1984.  Richard Halloran, U.S. Withdrawing Its Military 
Force on Lebanon Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1984, at 1. 
  59  In this respect, President Truman’s unilateral foray into Korea was something of a historical 
anomaly.  For the most part, as public awareness of an international crisis becomes more pro-
nounced, we would anticipate presidents to be leery of escalating the crisis unless they are assured 
of either formal congressional support or a relatively quick and easy victory.    
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rary political science, additional “veto players” — tend to create “grid-
lock” or “status quo bias.”60  The prevailing positive account of policy 
gridlock is straightforward: multiple veto points increase constraints 
on policy change because the veto players (for example, the median 
member of Congress and the President) will often have conflicting pre-
ferences.61  Thus, all else equal, we should expect more frequent policy 
change when power is concentrated in one institution, or when the 
government is unified under a disciplined political party.62  Yet again, 
our theoretical analysis suggests conclusions that are different from — 
and more optimistic than — the conventional wisdom: the addition of 
another veto player need not substantially increase status quo bias — 
indeed, under some conditions, it may not increase status quo bias at 
all. 
Although adding a veto player (for example, Congress) has the 
straightforward first-order effect of blocking some initiatives that the 
agenda setter (for example, the President) would otherwise have pre-
ferred to adopt, which reduces the frequency of policy change all else 
equal, all else is not equal.  The voters are aware that Congress will 
screen out some presidential initiatives, and as a result, the voters will 
rationally readjust their electoral strategies.  Recall that in the case of 
unilateral presidential authority, voters partially compensate for the 
risk that the President may be biased by using an asymmetric electoral 
strategy that makes the new policy less attractive.  In a separation of 
powers regime, the voters reduce this asymmetry, which in turn in-
creases the frequency of policy change, all else equal.  This second-
order effect — the change in voter strategy — may partially or fully 
offset the first-order effect of the additional veto player. 
It is therefore difficult to state with confidence whether the addi-
tion of a veto player reduces the ex ante expected level of policy out-
put, which means that relying on either divided government or the se-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  60  Traditionally, commentators have viewed policy gridlock as one of the prominent failings of 
both the United States’s constitutional structure and its weak political parties.  One such early 
example is SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1862).  For a detailed analysis of Fisher’s thesis and its shortcomings, see Wil-
liam H. Riker, Sidney George Fisher and the Separation of Powers During the Civil War, 15 J. 
HIST. IDEAS 397 (1954).  Perhaps the classic statement of this problem can be found in WOOD-
ROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 54–81 (Transac-
tion Publishers 2002) (1908). 
  61  See Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of Economic 
Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21, 61–63 (Stephan Haggard & 
Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001); Tsebelis, supra note 3, at 296–97.  See generally GIOVANNI 
SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING (2d ed. 1997). 
  62  Cf. MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 8–10 (2003) (arguing that we 
now live in an era of divided government in which radical policy initiatives by the political 
branches are unlikely); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 20, at 2340–41 (suggesting that divided gov-
ernment will make it more difficult for a government to implement significant legislation).    
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paration of powers as a predictor for lower policy output might be 
misguided.  We do not have the data that would allow us to conduct 
rigorous comparative empirical tests of the hypothesis that voters off-
set the addition of veto players by changing their electoral strategies.  
That said, our theoretical conjectures are broadly consistent with some 
of the findings in the literature exploring the effects of divided gov-
ernment on legislative output.  In a sweeping review of legislation 
passed by Congress since 1946, Professor David Mayhew evaluated 
and rejected the received wisdom that certain features of the separa-
tion of powers — such as divided government — hinder legislative 
productivity.63  Another piece of suggestive evidence is that, during pe-
riods of divided government, presidents suffer less blame for policy 
failure.64  While this evidence is broadly consistent with the notion 
that elected politicians engage in responsibility shifting, it is also con-
sistent with the hypothesis that voters do not need to rely as extensive-
ly on asymmetric political punishments to constrain the President dur-
ing times of divided government.  Either way, the implication is that a 
meaningful separation of powers reduces the President’s downside 
electoral risks from policy initiatives, which should lead, all else equal, 
to a greater willingness to pursue such policies. 
D.  Voter Welfare 
One traditional justification for the separation of powers asserts 
that separation of powers benefits voters by limiting the degree to 
which politicians cater to narrow interest groups.65  Our analysis 
builds on this argument, showing another advantage of the separation 
of powers: it allows voters more levers to influence the conditions un-
der which new policies can be adopted.  Our analysis differs from the 
traditional argument in one crucial respect: in our model, voters are 
best off under a regime in which the agenda setter has the option to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  63  DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 1–7 (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that there is no 
correlation between the passage of major legislation and the existence of one-party or divided 
government); cf. LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, at xi (4th ed. 1998) (ob-
serving that permanent impasses in the American system are exceedingly rare).  But see William 
Howell et al., Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945–94, 25 LE-
GIS. STUD. Q. 285, 300 (2000) (concluding that divided government depresses “landmark” legis-
lation, has no effect on important nonlandmark legislation, and has a positive effect on trivial  
legislation). 
  64   See Stephen P. Nicholson, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, Presidential Approval and 
the Mixed Blessing of Divided Government, 64 J. POL. 701, 703 (2002). 
  65  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 3, at 290 (“[T]he constant 
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check  
on the other — that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the pub- 
lic rights.”); cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 84–85 (1998) (arguing that large, biparti- 
san coalitions tend to have greater success breaking through the divisions inherent to U.S.   
lawmaking).    
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seek the approval of another branch, rather than a regime in which 
such joint approval is required. 
At first glance, the notion that an “optional” separation of powers 
might be better than a mandatory one for controlling agency slack 
seems counterintuitive.  After all, one would expect that increasing the 
number of mandatory veto points would decrease the opportunities for 
politicians to be captured by interest groups.  But as our analysis 
shows, there are two types of costs associated with agency slack: (1) 
those costs associated with adopting policies that create private bene-
fits for politicians but hurt the median voter (false positives) and (2) 
those costs associated with preventing policy changes that benefit the 
median voter but create private harms for politicians (false negatives).  
An optional separation of powers is more effective at minimizing these 
costs than is a mandatory separation (and both are more effective than 
a unilateral regime). 
The basic intuition for this proposition is as follows: When voters 
are able to observe not only the policy outcome, but also the decisions 
that led to the adoption of the final policy, the structure of the separa-
tion of powers affects the number of degrees of freedom voters have  
to influence government decisions.  Imperfectly informed voters can 
adopt more refined strategies when they can condition their voting 
strategies on a larger number of observed paths to a policy outcome.  
In the unilateral authority case, voters only have one lever — the rela-
tive credit and blame assigned to the President for policy success and 
failure, respectively.  In the mandatory separation of powers regime, 
voters have two levers at their disposal: the relative credit and blame 
assigned to the President, and the relative credit and blame assigned to 
Congress.  Finally, in the voluntary separation of powers regime, vot-
ers can assign the President different levels of relative credit and 
blame depending on whether the President acted unilaterally or with 
congressional authorization.  This gives the voters more flexibility to 
“fine-tune” the conditions under which a new policy will be adopted. 
To illustrate, consider the decision of a President to embark on a 
foreign military initiative.  In a unilateral system, voters can mediate 
the risks of false positives (unjustified military interventions) through 
an asymmetric sanctioning strategy.  However, such a strategy will not 
completely eliminate the risk of false positives and will increase the 
risk of false negatives.  By contrast, in a mandatory separation of 
powers system, an unbiased Congress will screen out false positives — 
voters need only worry about false positives in situations in which 
both the President and Congress are biased in favor of war, which oc-
cur with lower frequency than do situations in which the President 
alone is biased.  Voters can therefore reduce the asymmetry in their 
electoral sanctioning strategy, which in turn reduces the risk of false 
negatives.  In an optional system of separated powers, the institutional 
dynamics are more complex, but also more advantageous to the voters.     
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Under mandatory separation of powers, voters’ main costs are those 
from false positives, which occur when both the President and Con-
gress are captured by the pro-war faction, and from false negatives, 
which occur when the President is unbiased but the voters’ asymme-
tric punishment strategy deters the President from acting.  When the 
President has the option of acting unilaterally or going to Congress, the 
voters can use a different sanctioning strategy in each of these circums-
tances.  The voters can make joint decisionmaking relatively attractive 
to the President, which in turn allows the voters to use an asymmetric 
sanctioning strategy in order to offset Congress’s possible bias without 
causing an excessive increase in the frequency of false negatives.  The 
optional system thus enables the voter to encourage the President to 
adopt consensual decisionmaking procedures when such procedures 
are likely to pull policy toward the voter’s preferred outcome.  The 
President may act unilaterally, but since the President’s choice to act 
unilaterally is costly from an electoral perspective, he will likely choose 
to act unilaterally only in those rare circumstances in which he is rela-
tively sure of an outcome favored by voters.  In sum, our central nor-
mative conjecture is that, when circumstances consistent with the 
principal assumptions of our analysis obtain, increasing the number of 
levers through which voters can influence policy outcomes will de-
crease the risks of policy abuse, all else equal. 
IV.  LIMITATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 
The analysis in Part II relied on a number of strong assumptions.  
Many of these assumptions, while unrealistic, are benign simplifica-
tions.  Other assumptions, however, are more substantive.  In this Part, 
we elaborate three of the most important assumptions that undergird 
our theoretical analysis: (1) the rationality of retrospective electoral 
sanctioning; (2) the efficacy of electoral incentives in disciplining politi-
cians; and (3) voters’ capacity to observe not only what policy was 
chosen, but also how (that is, through what institutional pathway) that 
policy was chosen.  Our objectives in elaborating these assumptions 
are twofold.  First, we want to delineate carefully the conditions under 
which our theoretical argument may apply — and, correlatively, the 
conditions under which it would not apply.  Second, we want to sug-
gest why these conditions, while not universal, are sufficiently common 
that our theoretical argument has real-world applicability. 
A.  Rational Retrospective Voting 
We assume that voters are rational and that they vote retrospec-
tively, rewarding or punishing incumbent politicians on the basis of 
their past behavior in office.  Furthermore, we assume that voters 
adopt whatever retrospective voting strategy will induce the best 
achievable ex ante incentives for incumbent politicians.  The assump-   
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tion that voters vote retrospectively rather than prospectively has sig-
nificant empirical and theoretical support.66  The assumption that vot-
ers’ retrospective voting strategies are tailored to induce optimal ex 
ante incentives, however, is more problematic and controversial.  An 
important contrary argument holds that voters’ electoral behavior is 
driven principally by a desire to “elect good types,” rather than to pu-
nish poor performance, and that what looks like retrospective sanc-
tioning actually derives from the fact that voters learn important in-
formation about likely future behavior from past performance in 
office.67  This contrary argument draws support from a powerful theo-
retical critique of our assumption, which we want to acknowledge and 
make as transparent as possible.  That critique points out that our as-
sumption requires a rational voter to make an electoral decision — re-
taining or rejecting an incumbent — in order to affect behavior that, 
at the time of the voter’s electoral decision, has already occurred.  But 
if a rational voter prefers one candidate to the other at the time of  
the election, how could that voter follow through on her threat (or 
promise) to punish (or reward) the incumbent on the basis of past   
performance?   
There are three main lines of response to this critique.  First, there 
may be conditions under which it is plausible to assume that some crit-
ical mass of voters is indifferent between the incumbent and the chal-
lenger with respect to expected future performance.  (Any voter who is 
indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger at the moment 
of the election can vote any way she wants without violating the 
axioms of rational behavior.)  This indifference might arise, for exam-
ple, if the median voter thinks that all politicians are basically the 
same — that they all have some susceptibility to venality, incompe-
tence, or capture, but that this propensity is basically constant across 
politicians.  Further, at least for a subset of the electorate (probably at 
or near the median), the ideological differences between the candidates 
may not matter, because although the candidates may differ ideologi-
cally, they may diverge from the centrist voters by the same amount.  
It is more plausible to expect that such voters would adopt a voting 
strategy that maximizes their ex ante expected welfare. 
Second, it might be possible for voters to commit to particular elec-
toral strategies in advance.  If such precommitment is possible, then as 
long as the incentives to deviate ex post are not too strong, retrospec-
tive voting may be consistent with rational behavior.  It is not entirely 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  66  See FIORINA, supra note 2, at 6, 20–43; POWELL, supra note 2, at 47–51.  Professor John 
Ferejohn has also argued that since politicians tend to have an informational advantage over vot-
ers in understanding the political landscape, voters economize by relying heavily on a politician’s 
actual performance rather than his campaign promises.  See Ferejohn, supra note 2, at 13.   
  67  See Fearon, supra note 2, at 69.    
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clear, however, what devices voters might use to precommit themselves 
to an electoral strategy that is suboptimal ex post.  Perhaps voters can 
condition themselves psychologically to follow through on their pre-
commitment.  Or perhaps organized interest groups can rely on repu-
tational mechanisms by declaring in advance — in some way that 
would be costly to ignore later on — how they will react to various 
outcomes.  We are skeptical about the plausibility of these sorts of 
commitment mechanisms, but we note that they are possible. 
The third response is less theoretical than empirical.  There does 
seem to be some degree of observed retrospective sanctioning behavior 
in actual elections.  Some of this retrospective voting may in fact be 
prospective, in that voters may be using past performance to predict 
future performance, but there are some cases in which some voters ap-
peared willing to vote against their interests in order to punish an in-
cumbent for performance in office.  Consider Democratic voters in 
1968 who stayed home rather than vote for Hubert Humphrey, despite 
their clear preference for Humphrey over Richard Nixon, in order to 
punish the incumbent Democratic administration for the Vietnam 
War.68  A more recent example might be Republicans and conservative 
independent voters who either stayed home or supported Barack Ob-
ama, despite a prospective preference for John McCain, in order to 
punish the Republican party for perceived incompetence and malfeas-
ance under the George W. Bush Administration.69  It is of course poss-
ible that this sort of retrospective voting, when it occurs, is emotional 
rather than rational, which raises legitimate questions about whether it 
is appropriate to study such behavior using a rational choice frame-
work.  While we acknowledge this concern, we think that one could 
alternatively interpret this phenomenon as evidence that a subset of 
rational voters have found some way, psychologically or institutionally, 
to overcome their commitment problem. 
In the end, while we are aware of the problems with the assump-
tion of rational retrospective voter sanctioning and the limits it impos-
es on our analysis, we nonetheless think that the pure sanctioning as-
sumption is a reasonable starting point for exploring how alternative 
political institutions interact with voter behavior. 
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  68  See E.M. Schreiber, Vietnam Policy Preferences and Withheld 1968 Presidential Votes, 37 
PUB. OPINION Q. 91, 91 (1973) (“[D]isaffected Vietnam doves insisted in arguing that . . . the best 
vote for those of dovish persuasion would be no vote at all.”). 
  69  Sarah Baxter, Republicans Defect to the Obama Camp, SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 6, 
2007, at 1-27 (“Disillusioned supporters of President George W. Bush are defecting to Barack  
Obama.”).     
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B.  Effective Electoral Discipline 
Our analysis is premised on the idea that voters’ anticipated elec-
toral behavior can influence incumbents’ policy choices.  Several poten-
tial problems, however, might undermine the effectiveness of the elec-
toral constraint.  One obvious difficulty is that elections often involve 
a multitude of issues but only present the voter with a binary choice.  
Because voters have to base their decisions on a bundle of policy is-
sues, an elected official might have some latitude to ignore the voters’ 
preferences on some of those issues without significant risk of punish-
ment.70  This problem, though real, should not be overstated.  Any 
politician who anticipates a close election will care about the political 
consequences of all her decisions.  More importantly, in light of our 
key assumption (discussed further in section C) that voters can observe 
the decisions of each institutional actor involved in the policymaking 
process, our analysis will pertain principally to a relatively small num-
ber of high-profile, high-stakes issues where such voter attentiveness is 
plausible.71  Those issues are likely to be particularly salient to voters’ 
electoral decisions, so it will be harder for politicians to get away with 
bad policy choices on these issues by performing well on other issues. 
The second possible problem with our assumption that elections 
are an effective constraint on incumbent politicians is that some in-
cumbents might not seek, or might not be eligible for, reelection (for 
example, second-term presidents).  But this concern should also not be 
overstated.  As Professors Charles Ostrom and Dennis Simon have 
pointed out, “the [President’s] need for public support never abates,” 
even in his second term.72  There are a number of reasons for this.  
First, presidential approval is very important for the success of the 
President’s domestic and foreign policy initiatives.73  Second, presi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  70  Professors Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen suggest that one way to address this prob-
lem would be to create a plural executive in which discrete authority for each policy area is taken 
from the President and given exclusively to a directly elected executive official.  See Berry & Ger-
sen, supra note 4; see also Gersen, supra note 4 (taking this argument a step further by suggesting 
unbundling of authority across issue areas ought to be augmented by combining functional au-
thority within issue areas into a single decisionmaker). 
  71  To be sure, it is likely that politicians care not only about those issues that are contempora-
neously salient to voters, but also about those issues that are likely to be salient during the next 
election.  But since politicians may not always anticipate correctly all the potentially salient issues, 
it is plausible that they may err on the side of caution and be overinclusive in their judgments 
with respect to such issues.  If so, the scope of issues affected by our analysis may actually be 
more extensive than we suggest. 
  72  Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Dennis M. Simon, Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of 
Presidential Popularity, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334, 335 (1985). 
  73  See Robin F. Marra, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Dennis M. Simon, Foreign Policy and Presi-
dential Popularity: Creating Windows of Opportunity in the Perpetual Election, 34 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 588, 589–91 (1990) (summarizing literature on how presidential popularity affects legisla-
tive productivity).     
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dents are motivated by legacy concerns and thus have an incentive to 
maintain legislative and personal influence during their waning days 
in office.74  Finally, presidents have an interest in the electoral fortunes 
of their copartisans, including the fortunes of the party’s successor-
candidate.75 
The third potential problem with the assumption that electoral dis-
cipline constrains incumbents concerns the assumption that voters 
have information about policy success or failure prior to the election.  
If there are significant lags between a policy decision and its observa-
ble effects, however, political leaders might be able to manipulate the 
institutional environment to avoid electoral punishment, at least in the 
short run.  Thus, a President might decide to embark on an imprudent 
policy decision right before or after an election because he realizes that 
the consequences of the policy will not be observed before the election 
or will be forgotten by the time the next election occurs. 
Our claims about the effect of different separation of powers re-
gimes on voter behavior and incumbent incentives apply only in those 
cases where meaningful information about a policy’s success or failure 
will become available before the election.  That requirement does not 
mean that voters have to be able to observe the full effect of the policy 
— something that may never be completely known.  (As the Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly remarked when asked in 1972 about 
the effects of the French Revolution, “It’s too early to tell.”)  What it 
does mean is that there must be some meaningful feedback that the 
voters can use to decide whether to punish or reward the incumbent — 
for example, whether the war is going well or badly, whether the fi-
nancial system has recovered or collapsed, and so forth. 
Finally, it is worth observing that when electoral discipline is inef-
fective, questions about the degree to which different separation of 
powers regimes complement electoral discipline are rendered largely 
irrelevant.  In such cases, the relevant questions about institutional de-
sign will likely turn on which separation of powers arrangements will 
best  substitute for electoral discipline as a check on political agency 
slack.  The institutional structures that may be most effective in com-
plementing electoral discipline (when such discipline can impose mea-
ningful constraints on politicians) may look quite different from the in-
stitutional structures that provide the most effective substitute 
constraints.  Because this Article is concerned principally with explor-
ing the former issue, we do not pursue this observation further, but we 
note that the possible distinction, or even tension, between institutions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  74  See Levinson, supra note 10, at 956–57. 
  75  Alberto Alesina & Stephen E. Spear, An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Com-
petition, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 359, 361 (1988).     
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designed to complement and institutions designed to substitute for 
electoral control is an important and underexplored issue in the sepa-
ration of powers literature. 
C.  Clarity of Responsibility 
A crucial assumption of our analysis — indeed, the assumption that 
drives our most important results — is that voters observe not only the 
policy choice and the policy outcome, but also the way in which the 
policy was adopted: which institutions supported it, which opposed it, 
whether the President acted unilaterally or with congressional support, 
whether the proposal died due to lack of presidential support or due to 
congressional opposition, and so forth.  But one might reasonably 
question whether, or under what conditions, a sufficient portion of the 
electorate is able to make such careful distinctions. 
We acknowledge this limitation, and we make two observations 
about its implications for our conclusions.  First, we do not think that 
our assumption that voters can observe how the policy choice was 
made is too stringent, at least for high-salience policy decisions.  While 
the empirical evidence on voter confusion in attributing accountability 
under various institutional arrangements is mixed,76 recent compara-
tive studies regarding the effects of economic policy and outcomes on 
electoral choice tend to support our conjecture.  For instance, Professor 
Christopher Anderson’s study of the politics of blame in five European 
democracies found that voters tend to take a nuanced view of the insti-
tutional context when sanctioning political actors for economic out-
comes.77  Likewise, Professor Thomas Rudolph’s more recent empirical 
study concludes that “citizens have the capacity to act as discriminat-
ing and sensible consumers of contextual information when making 
judgments of political responsibility.”78  W e  r e c o g n i z e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
our current knowledge about how voters attribute responsibility for 
policy outcomes under different institutional contexts remains imper-
fect, and thus our assumption here is necessarily speculative. 
Second, we embrace the observation that adding too many partici-
pants to the decisionmaking process would make that process so com-
plex that rational voters could not implement the kind of tailored elec-
toral strategy we propose.  (Without this consideration, our theoretical 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  76  Compare Bernard Manin et al., Elections and Representation, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUN-
TABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 2, at 29, 47 (explaining that accountability is 
more difficult under coalition governments and divided government), with Helmut Norpoth, Di-
vided Government and Economic Voting, 63 J. POL. 414, 426 (2001) (“There is no evidence that 
the American electorate is incapable of assigning responsibility for the economy because the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of government are in different partisan hands.”). 
  77  See CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON, BLAMING THE GOVERNMENT 199–211 (1995).  
  78  Thomas J. Rudolph, Who’s Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences 
of Responsibility Attributions, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 698, 710 (2003).      
2010]  COMPLEMENTARY CONSTRAINTS  653 
analysis would imply the seemingly absurd hypothesis that arbitrarily 
increasing the degree of power diffusion and complexity in the policy 
process would always increase voter welfare.)  Very few voters, regard-
less of their sophistication, would be able to make much headway in 
assigning blame or credit in a system in which a dozen or more gov-
ernment branches participated in proposing or vetoing policy initia-
tives.  These complexity costs mean that the optimal number of poli-
cymaking pathways is finite and probably relatively small.  That said, 
we do not think this consideration necessarily undermines the signific-
ance of our central normative claim regarding the benefits of an op-
tional system of separated powers with only two branches. 
CONCLUSION 
Public law scholarship generally, and American constitutional law 
scholarship in particular, has not adequately explored how institutional 
factors such as the separation of powers influence voter behavior.  Ex-
isting commentary tends to focus on the limitations or strengths of ei-
ther electoral accountability or the separation of powers, but not on 
how these two regime characteristics interact.  And, the extant scholar-
ship that does focus on the relationship between these two control me-
chanisms has emphasized (and evaluated) the degree to which they are 
substitutes. 
This Article suggests that rational voter behavior is shaped by how 
institutions diffuse political authority.  When faced with an institution-
al context that affords elected officials more opportunities to pursue 
private or partisan objectives at the expense of the public welfare, vot-
ers will compensate by adopting a sanctioning and reward strategy 
that discourages the abuse of power.  For example, voters will punish 
presidents more (and reward them less) for their policy decisions when 
they act unilaterally, but adopt a more refined strategy when presi-
dents act jointly with Congress.  Thus, this Article is intended as a 
contribution to a small but growing literature that considers the ways 
in which separation of powers institutions and elections might function 
as complements. 
Our analysis has implications for ongoing debates in both positive 
and normative constitutional theory.  In contrast to the claim that ava-
ricious presidential empire building will undermine the separation of 
powers regime, our analysis suggests that electoral constraints will of-
ten lead presidents to share power with Congress.  In contrast to the 
claim that responsibility-shifting behavior in separation of powers sys-
tems shows that such systems undermine electoral accountability, our 
analysis suggests that rational voter strategies may induce behavior 
that looks like responsibility shifting, meaning that such behavior may 
be evidence that electoral accountability is working well, not poorly.  
In contrast to the claim that separation of powers induces status quo    
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bias, our analysis suggests that although the addition of another veto 
player may create an impediment to policy change, this effect may be 
partly or fully offset by a rational relaxation of the electoral deterrent 
to policy change. 
Perhaps most significantly, we argue that voters are better off when 
they have more levers for controlling agency slack and that a separa-
tion of powers may therefore enhance voter welfare by increasing the 
number of policymaking “pathways” on which voters can condition 
their electoral responses.  This hypothesis further implies that a system 
of optional separation of powers may sometimes be more beneficial for 
the electorate than a mandatory separation of powers system.  We 
want to be appropriately cautious in advancing this hypothesis — we 
are not arguing for wholesale abandonment of strict power-sharing re-
quirements.  That said, this insight, and the reasoning behind it, may 
add an important dimension to ongoing discussions about optimal con-
stitutional design. 